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Trower v. Jones: Expanding the Scope of
Permissible Cross-Examination of
Expert Witnesses
I.

INTRODUCTION

Expert witnesses are used in litigation to assist the trier of fact in
ascertaining information not commonly understood.' The goal of
expert testimony is to give the trier of fact the opportunity to make
fully informed determinations of the issues to be resolved at trial.
Ideally, such assistance is beneficial to the discovery of truth and
attainment of justice.' Experts are permitted to testify, in the form
of opinion, even when the subject matter of their testimony is an
ultimate fact for the jury to determine. 3 In order for such opinion
evidence to be admissible, however, it must be based upon facts
and reasonable inferences adduced at trial.4 Yet because expert
1. Opp v. Pryor, 294 I11.538, 545, 128 N.E. 580, 583 (1920). See McCallister v. del
Castillo, 18 I11.App. 3d 1041, 310 N.E.2d 474 (4th Dist. 1974) (medical expert's opinions
regarding neurosurgical procedures are admissible because the techniques at issue are
clearly outside common knowledge); Kobrand Corp. v. Foremost Sales Promotions, Inc.,
8 I11.App. 3d 418, 291 N.E.2d 61 (lst Dist. 1972) (a liquor industry specialist's opinion
regarding the effects of competition between particular brands of gin is admissible as
expert testimony); Filipello v. Filipello, 130 I11.App. 2d 1089, 268 N.E.2d 478 (1st Dist.
1971) (expert testimony regarding the psychological effects of placing children with their
father rather than their mother should have been admitted into evidence). See also Hernandez v. Power Constr. Co., 73 I11.2d 90, 382 N.E.2d 1201 (1978) (expert opinion is
inadmissible when it goes to matters of common knowledge); Dobkowski v. Lowe's, Inc.,
20 I11.App. 3d 275, 314 N.E.2d 623 (5th Dist. 1974) (a reconstruction expert's testimony
is unnecessary when physical evidence is easily understood by the average juror).
2. Opp, 294 II1. at 545, 128 N.E. at 583. See also Payne v. Noles, 5 Ill. App. 3d 433,
283 N.E.2d 329 (2d Dist. 1972) (expert testimony should not be admitted unless necessary to assist the jury in arriving at just and correct results). See infra note 4 and accompanying text.
3. Ultimate facts are those required to establish the plaintiff's cause of action or the
defendant's theory of defense. See, e.g., Crump v. Universal Safety Equip. Co., 79 I11.
App. 3d 202, 398 N.E.2d 188 (1st Dist. 1979) (testimony that goes to the ultimate issue in
the case is not inadmissible when rendered by an expert and in the form of an opinion);
Cunningham v. Yazoo Mfg. Co., 39 I11.App. 3d 498, 350 N.E.2d 514 (3d Dist. 1976)
(because the matters testified to by an expert, even when regarding the ultimate issue, are
beyond average and common knowledge, juries need not unequivocally accept the expert's opinion); Matthews v. Stewart Warner Corp., 20 II1.App. 3d 470, 314 N.E.2d 683
(1st Dist. 1974) (in a product liability action, the expert witness was allowed to testify as
to his opinion of the product's defectiveness).
4. Nelson v. Speed Fastener, Inc., 101 I11.App. 3d 539, 428 N.E.2d 495 (1st Dist.
1981). See also First Nat'l Bank v. Sousanes, 96 I11.App. 3d 1047, 422 N.E.2d 188 (1st
Dist. 1981) (experts are allowed to testify to the ultimate issue of liability when asked to
assume facts and reasonable inferences adduced from evidence at trial); Schwartz v. Peo-
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testimony is rendered in the form of opinion, rather than a recounting of facts, it is arguably less trustworthy than other forms
of admissible evidence. The fact that virtually all expert witnesses
who testify at trial are paid for their services adds to the problem of
reliability.6
Information testified to by experts is, by definition, specialized
and presumed to be outside of the jurors' general field of knowledge. 7 Therefore, an expert witness may be the only participant in
the trial who fully understands some of the facts that are crucial to
the resolution of the issues. Because the expert's testimony may be
the sole source of information on the ultimate issue in a particular
case, the impact of expert testimony on the jury can be profound.8
Parties seeking to lessen the impact of expert testimony use varied tactics. A party may call its own expert to counter the testimony. 9 Treatises advocating different conclusions than those
pies Gas Light & Coke Co., 35 Ill. App. 2d 25, 181 N.E.2d 826 (1st Dist. 1962) (expert
witnesses may not state opinions based solely on conjecture, but they are qualified to
draw inferences from facts in formulating their opinion testimony).
5. See generally Graham, Impeaching the Professional Expert Witness by a Showing
of FinancialInterest, 53 IND. L.J. 35, 37 (1977-78) (many judges and legal scholars consider expert testimony of opinion inherently suspect). See infra note 98.
at 545, 128 N.E. at 583. See infra note 110.
6. Opp, 294 I11.
7. Under Illinois law, an "expert witness" is defined as follows:
An expert is a person who, because of education, training or experience, possesses knowledge of a specialized nature beyond that of the average person on a
factual matter material to a claim or defense in pending litigation and who may
be expected to render an opinion within his expertise at trial. He may be an
employee of a party, a party or an independent contractor.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 220 (1987). See also Montefelice v. Terminal R.R.
Ass'n, 100 II1. App. 3d 858, 427 N.E.2d 370 (1st Dist. 1981) (experts testify to opinions
on subjects which are not common knowledge and wide latitude should be given to crossexamining counsel).
8. See generally Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 Ill. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist.
1959). The court, in dictum, commented extensively on the expert medical witness's
unique ability to influence juries:
[The expert] generally is a persuasive, fluent, impressive witness, able to make
the jury understand that what he is telling them is the product of years of educational preparation .... That he is being paid by one side is always skillfully
lost in casual answers to cross-examining cynical questions .... [L]ittle did the
non-litigating public know the true rhetorical masterpieces that came from the
lips of medical experts on the witness stand and how they, as much as the lawyers, shattered the aerial limits of verdicts in personal injury cases and made
hundreds of thousands grow where only thousands grew before.
Id. at 170-71, 159 N.E.2d at 493-94. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 Ill. 2d 402, 406, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212
(1984) ("[t]he modern personal injury trial often becomes a battle between expert witApp. 3d 457, 473 N.E.2d 1322 (4th Dist. 1985) (both
nesses"); Lebrecht v. Tuli, 130 I11.
plaintiff and defendant in a malpractice action called several expert witnesses to testify on
the issues of standard of care and causation).
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expressed by the expert may be used for impeachment purposes.'
An expert's qualifications may be scrutinized. " Additionally, experts, like all witnesses, may be impeached by prior inconsistent
statements. 12
Moreover, the weight a jury gives to expert testimony is directly
linked to the perceived credibility of the witness.' 3 Therefore, a
most effective means of diminishing the importance of an expert's
testimony is to demonstrate the witness's bias, partisanship, or fi4
nancial interest through cross-examination.'
The scope of permissible cross-examination is within the discretion of the trial court.' 5 Because expert testimony is based primarily on hypothetical facts and specialized knowledge, certain
problems arise with respect to the impeachment of experts through
cross-examination. Prior to 1988, minimal Illinois case law ad10. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(18), which states that treatises are admissible:
To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on a subject of history,
medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial
notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be
received as exhibits.
Id. See also Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 64 I11. 2d 543, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976) (medical
witnesses may be cross-examined regarding relevant professional medical literature);
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 I11.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (expert witness can be impeached by demonstrating, through cross-examination, a contradiction between the actual text of authoritative treatises and the opinions of the expert allegedly formed based upon such treatises).
11. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2501 (1987). In medical malpractice
cases where the standard of care is at issue, the expert must conform to enumerated
standards in order to qualify for expert status and testify at trial.
12. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110., para. 2-1102 (1987) (allowing impeachment of a
witness of an adverse party or agent by proof of prior inconsistent statements). See also
FED. R. EVID. 613(b) (allowing the admission of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent
statements as long as the witness is given the opportunity to explain the discrepancy and
opposing counsel is allowed to question the witness).
13. See generally Kerfoot v. City of Chicago, 195 I11.229, 235, 63 N.E. 101, 103
(1902) (the weight to be given to an expert's opinions depends upon the witness's knowledge, biases, and connections with the litigants).
14. Id. See also Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 I11.2d 402, 407, 466 N.E.2d 210, 212
(1984) (attacking an expert's credibility is the best means of discrediting his testimony
because experts testify to their opinions, making it "virtually impossible" to prosecute
them for perjury).
15. McMahon v. Chicago City Ry., 239 II1. 334, 341, 88 N.E. 223, 225 (1909); Lebrecht v. Tuli, 130 I11.App. 3d 457, 478, 473 N.E.2d 1322, 1337 (4th Dist. 1985). Accordingly, reversal of the trial court is appropriate only when an abuse of discretion has
resulted in prejudicial error. See, e.g., Davis v. Hinde, 141 II1. App. 3d 664, 665, 490
N.E.2d 1049, 1050 (2d Dist. 1986); City of Chicago v. Merton Realty, 99 I11.App. 3d
101, 105, 424 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (1st Dist. 1981); City of Chicago v. Avenue State Bank,
4 Ill. App. 3d 235, 281 N.E.2d 66, 71 (1st Dist. 1972).

1074

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

dressed the permissible scope of cross-examination of an expert to
show bias or interest. Few coherent rules on the subject have been
articulated affirmatively.' 6 Generally, cross-examination has been
limited to questions about the witness's actions with respect to only
the specific litigating party 7 or attorney.'I
In Trower v. Jones,'9 however, the Illinois Supreme Court departed from previous authority and set forth expanded limits on
the cross-examination of experts to show bias or interest.2 ° The
decision allows for cross-examination to probe the witness's professional behavior generally, rather than limiting the inquiry to the
specific lawsuit in which the testimony is offered 2' or to the specific
parties or attorneys to that suit.
This Note will first examine the trend in Illinois law prior to the
Trower decision. Next, the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in
Trower will be set forth and analyzed. Finally, the ramifications of
the decision on litigants using experts, as well as those seeking to
attack an expert's testimony, will be discussed.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Permissible Cross-Examination: Early Decisions

The Illinois Supreme Court established the permissible scope of
cross-examination of an expert witness in a series of cases decided
in the early 1900s. In Kerfoot v. City of Chicago,22 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that a trial court should permit cross-examination regarding the witnesses' fees for testifying. 23 In Kerfoot, a
group of property owners challenged a special assessment levied by
the city for street improvements. 24 At trial, the City called several
real estate experts to substantiate the city engineer's determination
of the benefit to the property owners.25 The trial court sustained
16. See, e.g., Sears, 102 I11. 2d at 408, 466 N.E.2d at 213. In Sears, the Illinois
Supreme Court noted that "[p]rior Illinois decisions have not clearly delineated the permissible bounds of cross-examination of medical experts." Id. See also McMahon, 239
Ill. at 341, 88 N.E. at 225 ("[njo definite limit can be prescribed as a rule of law").
17. See infra text accompanying notes 28-45.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 45-64.
19. 121 Ill. 2d 211, 520 N.E.2d 297 (1988).
20. Id. at 217, 520 N.E.2d at 300.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 90-108.
22. 195 I11.229, 63 N.E. 101 (1902).
23. Id. at 235, 63 N.E. at 103.
24. Id. at 230, 63 N.E. at 101. The special assessment in this case involved evaluating
the beneficial increase in property values that accrued to private businesses by virtue of
certain local street repair projects. Id. at 232, 63 N.E. at 103.
25. Id. at 234, 63 N.E. at 103.
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the City's objections to questions with respect to specific property
sales made by each expert and refused to allow cross-examination
regarding the precise amounts of money each expert was receiving
for testifying.2 6
The supreme court reasoned that in order for the jury to assess
the weight to be given expert testimony, counsel should be allowed
to inquire with specificity as to the amount of compensation the
witnesses had received in the past and were receiving in the instant
case. 27 The specific relationship between the witnesses and the parties was also deemed an appropriate subject of cross-examination.2 8
In McMahon v. Chicago City Railway,2 9 the Illinois Supreme
Court addressed the propriety of cross-examination regarding the
number of times that an expert testified on behalf of similar parties.
In McMahon, a streetcar conductor injured the plaintiff during an
altercation between the conductor and the plaintiff's husband.3 °
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial court erred in
allowing the plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine the defendant's
expert medical witness regarding how many times the expert had
testified for the various streetcar companies in Chicago."
The supreme court concluded that this line of questioning was
improper. The court cited Kerfoot for the general proposition that
showing a pecuniary interest affects the weight to be given to the
expert's opinions and, therefore, is permissible.3 2 The court, however, limited the permissible scope of inquiry to "the number of
26. Id. at 234-35, 63 N.E. at 103.
27. Id. Counsel for the City had admitted that the witnesses were employed by the
City to examine property in order to testify in special assessment litigation and that they
had been paid for such services. Id. at 234, 63 N.E. at 103. Two years later, the court
held, without citing authority, that an expert witness may be cross-examined to show that
the fees he received for testifying exceeded the statutorily stipulated amount. Chicago
City Ry. v. Handy, 208 11. 81, 83, 69 N.E. 917, 918 (1904).
28. Kerfoot, 195 Ill. at 234, 63 N.E. at 103. The court articulated no limitations on
cross-examination; rather, the court stated generally that "it is always competent to show
the interest of a witness and anything which would affect his credit or the value of his
opinion." Id. One year later, the court held that a witness's relationship with the party
paying his fee for testifying was relevant evidence even when it was revealed incidentally
that the employing party was the defendant's insurance carrier. Allen B. Wrisley Co. v.
Burke, 203 Ill. 250, 258, 67 N.E. 818, 821 (1903) [hereinafter Wrisley]. In Wrisley, the
court did not cite its holding in Kerfoot for support. The Kerfoot rule, apparently advocating cross-examination free of restriction, was modified to include restrictions in subsequent cases. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
29. 239 Ill.
334, 88 N.E. 223 (1909).
30. Id. at 337-38, 88 N.E. at 224.
31. Id. at 341, 88 N.E. at 225. The plaintiff's counsel was attempting to show the
expert's bias in favor of corporations. Id.
32. Id.
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times the witness had testified for appellant."33 Nevertheless, the
court reasoned that because the expert's response did not serve to
show the bias plaintiff's counsel was seeking to elicit, admission of
the cross-examination did not result in reversible error.34
B.

Extension of the McMahon Rule

The McMahon rule allowing only party-specific cross-examination was extended in subsequent cases to include other, related inquiries. The Illinois Supreme Court cited McMahon as authority
in a subsequent case, Plambeck v. Chicago Railway.35 In
Plambeck, the plaintiff, a passenger in the defendant's streetcar,
had suffered a miscarriage three weeks after a collision between a
freight train and the defendant's streetcar. 36 Immediately following the accident, a policeman at the scene asked the injured passengers on the streetcar to identify themselves for a report to be
submitted to city authorities. 37 The plaintiff did not tell either the
conductor or the policeman that she had been hurt.38
The defendant called the policeman to testify at trial.39 On
cross-examination, the policeman was asked whether he had testified for the defendant streetcar company "five or six times previous[ly]." 40 The witness also was asked whether it was true that he
33. Id. The court relied upon two earlier cases, Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Schmitz,
211 111. 446, 71 N.E. 1050 (1904) [hereinafter Schmitz] and Chicago City Ry. v. Smith,
226 I11.
178, 80 N.E. 716 (1907) [hereinafter Smith]. In Schmitz, the court held that
defendant's counsel properly was prohibited from cross-examining an injured plaintiff's
medical expert regarding the expert's professional opinion testimony in other cases.
Schmitz, 211 111. at 456, 71 N.E. at 1054. In addition, counsel properly was prevented
from showing the expert's tendency to testify only against corporations by calling other
witnesses to testify regarding such a reputation on direct examination. Id. In Smith, the
court held that the trial court did not err in "refusing to allow the cross-examination to
be extended to other cases having no connection with the case then being tried." Smith,
226 I11.
at 187, 80 N.E. at 720.
34. Id. The witness testified that he had acted as an expert witness for both plaintiff
and defendant companies. This response to plaintiff's counsel's improper cross-examination therefore "could not have been hurtful." Id.
35. 294 I11.
302, 128 N.E. 513 (1920).
36. Id. at 304, 128 N.E. at 514.
37. Id. At the time the names of the injured passengers were being collected, the
plaintiff did not realize that she was hurt.
38. Id. The plaintiff and her family boarded a different street car shortly after the
accident and visited friends as had been planned. The next day, however, the plaintiff felt
ill, and a large bruise was discovered on her abdomen by her doctor. Id.
39. Id. at 304-05, 128 N.E.2d at 514. Although the court did not expressly characterize the policeman as an "expert" witness for the defense, the policeman was called as a
witness to testify as to what happened while he acted in the official capacity of taking a
report at the accident scene.
40. Id. at 305, 128 N.E. at 514.
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had never testified for an injured plaintiff.4' The witness answered

both questions affirmatively.42
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the first inquiry was permissible, but that the second was improper, although not reversible
error.43 The court reasoned that the McMahon holding limited
questions regarding the frequency of testimony to show bias to the
number of times the witness had testified on behalf of the particular litigant involved in the case at bar." Although the second question was indeed aimed at showing bias in favor of the particular
defendant in the case, demonstrating such partisanship through an
argument of exclusion was proper.45
The limit on cross-examination imposed by McMahon and the
cases following McMahon prevented any inquiry from moving beyond the parties to the litigation. 46 Recently, however, Illinois
courts have interpreted this rule to allow examination regarding
the expert witness's relationship with the attorney retaining the expert. For example, a party properly can show, on cross-examination, that the attorney and the expert are related.47 Moreover, a
party can cross-examine an expert witness regarding the origin of
the relationship to opposing counsel.4 8
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Id. The court did "not regard the policeman's testimony of any particular significance" because the fact that others had been hurt in the accident had very little probative
value. Id. at 306, 128 N.E. at 515. Therefore, the error was not prejudicial to the defendant, and the judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. Id.
44. Id. at 305, 128 N.E. at 514. See also City of Chicago v. Van Schaack Bros. Chem.
Works, 330 Ill. 264, 161 N.E. 486 (1928) (per curiam) (in a case involving a special
assessment levied for construction of a sidewalk, it was reversible error to disallow crossexamination regarding the expert's basis for fees and amount of payment for testimony in
the instant trial and for testimony in previous assessment cases in which he was a witness
for the City).
45. Plambeck, 294 II1. at 305, 128 N.E. at 514. The court stated that "the mere fact
that he had never testified for any injured person formed no proper basis for drawing an
unfavorable conclusion from his testimony." Id. See Schoolfield v. Witkowski, 54 Ill.
App. 2d 11l, 203 N.E.2d 460 (1st Dist. 1964). In Schoolfield, the appellate court used
Plambeck as authority for holding that asking an expert medical witness if he had always
testified for "the person seeking to gain money" was improper cross-examination to show
bias in favor of personal injury plaintiffs. Id. at 127, 203 N.E.2d at 467.
46. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
47. General Steel Indus. v. Industrial Comm'n, 49 Ill. 2d 549, 555, 276 N.E.2d 290,
292 (1971). Because the relationship between plaintiff's counsel and plaintiff's medical
expert witness goes to the credibility of the witness and, therefore, to the weight to be
accorded his testimony, it was proper to show that the expert was the attorney's father.
Id.
48. Lebrecht v. Tuli, 130 II1. App. 3d 457, 478, 473 N.E.2d 1322, 1337 (4th Dist.
1985). The plaintiff's medical expert testified that she began reviewing medical malpractice files "when attorney friends of her attorney husband asked if she would be interested
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In Davis v. Gulf Mobile & Ohio Railroad,49 an Illinois appellate
court held that the plaintiff's expert medical witness could be
cross-examined as to whether he had received referrals from the
plaintiff's counsel.5 0 The court, however, also held that the trial
court erred in permitting the defense counsel, who was attempting
to show the frequency of such referrals, to ask whether the expert
remembered treating ten particular individuals. 5' The court cautioned that "there is no proper basis for going into specific cases
and to do so would be reversible error. 52
C.

The Sears Decision

The Illinois Supreme Court clarified the issue of a permissible
demonstration of the relationship between attorney and expert witness in Sears v. Rutishauser.53 In Sears, both the plaintiff and the
defendant called expert witnesses to testify as to the cause and severity of the plaintiff's neck injuries.54 The defendant called the
plaintiff's "family doctor," who testified that the plaintiff's condition, neck pain, and stiffness on the right side of her body may have
existed prior to the auto accident in question.5 5 The plaintiff's expert, a specialist in neurosurgery with "impeccable" professional
credentials, testified to the contrary.56 The defendant had filed a
motion in limine requesting the opportunity to impeach the plaintiff's expert by cross-examining him on the number and frequency
of referrals he had received from the plaintiff's counsel.5 7 The trial
court denied the motion, ruling that the only permissible question
in doing so." Id. Testimony establishing this social relationship can properly demonstrate the expert's bias and, therefore, was admissible to impeach her credibility. 1d.
49. 130 Ill. App. 2d 988 (Feb. 19, 1971), revised on denial of reh'g, 272 N.E.2d 240
(5th Dist. June 22, 1971).
50. Id. at 992, 272 N.E.2d at 245. The defendant's counsel posed the question: "You
do have occasion frequently, don't you to see patients that are referred to you by [plaintiff's counsel] or his office, to testify on behalf of those patients who are either claimants
or patients in lawsuits?" The doctor responded that he had received referrals, but refused
to characterize them as "frequent." Id. at 991, 272 N.E.2d at 243.
51. Id. at 991, 272 N.E.2d at 244-45.
52. Id. at 991, 272 N.E.2d at 245. In this particular case, the error was not reversible
because the doctor did not admit the frequency of referrals and remembered only one of
the patients about which he was questioned. Therefore, the error had not been prejudicial to plaintiff. Id. at 991, 992, 272 N.E.2d at 243, 245.
53. 102 I11.2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1984).
54. Id. at 405-06, 466 N.E.2d at 211-12.
55. Id. at 405, 466 N.E.2d at 211. The plaintiff's family doctor attributed the plaintiff's symptoms to arthritis, which he testified may have existed prior to the collision. Id.
56. Id. at 410, 466 N.E.2d at 214. The plaintiff's specialist attributed the pain and
loss of feeling to the accident. Id. at 405, 466 N.E.2d at 211.
57. Id. at 406, 466 N.E.2d at 212.
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was whether the expert generally had received any referrals from
the plaintiff's counsel.58
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination. 59
The court reasoned that a party, on cross-examination, may elicit
the number and frequency of referrals that an expert receives from
an attorney' to demonstrate the expert's bias or financial interest. 6 Furthermore, the court recognized that this form of questioning may be "the most promising avenue for . . . counsel to

pursue" in impeaching expert witnesses.62 After surveying the previous case law addressing this issue, the court defined the permissible scope of cross-examination as "strictly limited to the number of
referrals, their frequency, and the financial benefit derived from
them." 63 In addition, the court gave further guidance to trial
courts in the exercise of their discretion by warning against allowing impeachment inquiries that waste judicial resources 64 or vi58. Id.
59. Id. at 411, 466 N.E.2d at 215.
60. Although the court did not state specifically that cross-examination regarding
frequency of testifying from attorney referrals was limited to the attorney involved in the
litigation, the Illinois appellate courts interpreting Sears have recognized such a limitation. See Wilson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 159 I11.
App. 3d 1043, 1047, 513 N.E.2d 443,
446 (lst Dist. 1987) (affirmed trial court's attempt to follow Sears by disallowing a question regarding the frequency of testifying for injured plaintiffs generally); Lebrecht v.
Tuli, 130 Ill.
App. 3d 457, 478-79, 473 N.E.2d 1322, 1337-38 (4th Dist. 1985) (question
regarding frequency of testimony given in malpractice cases generally was phrased in a
"neutral fashion" and, therefore, was permissible).
61. Sears, 102 Ill. 2d at 411, 466 N.E.2d at 214. The court further emphasized that
"both sides should have been allowed great latitude in impeaching the other side's expert." Id. at 410, 466 N.E.2d at 214.
62. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff's counsel had so thoroughly impugned the
defense expert's credibility and humiliated him personally that the plaintiff's counsel
"took the unusual step of apologizing to the jury during his closing statement." Id. The
plaintiff's counsel had been permitted to demonstrate that defendant's expert "was 70
years old, was not board-certified as an orthopedic surgeon, and was not familiar with
some specialized terminology used by plaintiff's attorney." Id. The court contrasted this
with the fact that defense counsel had been permitted to ask the plaintiff's expert only
one question for impeachment purposes. Id.
63. Id. at 411, 466 N.E.2d at 214. The Sears court noted that the appellate court's
revision of Davis was incorrect. Id. at 409, 466 N.E.2d at 213. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text. The Sears court stated that the appellate court properly had interpreted Illinois law in its original Davis opinion, 130 I11.
App. 2d at 992, 272 N.E.2d at
244, holding that cross-examination regarding the number and frequency of referrals was
not error. Sears 102 Ill.
2d at 409, 466 N.E.2d at 213.
64. In interpreting the Sears decision, an Illinois appellate court held that cross-examination regarding referrals was proper as long as counsel "did not inquire into collateral matters such as other lawsuits." Lebrecht, 130 I1I. App. 3d at 478, 473 N.E.2d at
1337. In Davis v. Hinde, 141 III. App. 3d 664, 490 N.E.2d 1049 (2d Dist. 1986), the
appellate court noted that allowing inquiry into other lawsuits in which the expert had
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olate the physician-patient privilege.65
D. Other Jurisdictions
Evidentiary matters, including the scope of permissible cross-examination of expert witnesses, fall within the discretion of the trial
courts. As a result, the few state and federal cases addressing this
issue have taken diverse positions. Generally, most jurisdictions
permit the inquiries allowed in Illinois pursuant to Sears v. Rutishauser.66 Permissible examination includes questions regarding
the amount and calculation of the witness's fees in the instant litigation and the relationship, employment or otherwise, between the
witness and the party or attorney retaining him to testify in the
case at bar.67 State and federal jurisdictions, however, disagree
over allowing questions of the type now permitted in Illinois after
Trower v. Jones.6 The disputed questions regard previous compensation for testimony as an expert witness in other trials and the
frequency with which a witness testifies for a class of litigants.
State courts allowing questions regarding the frequency with
which an expert testifies for a particular class of litigants and the
fees that experts have received as witnesses in litigation reason that
such inquiries are relevant to show bias.69 For example, the Texas
Court of Appeals held that questions probing bias or partisanship
are "never collateral or immaterial."7 0 Similarly, the Missouri
Supreme Court has held that the trier of fact is entitled to hear all
testified would "necessarily result in . . time consuming subtrials remote from the subject of the lawsuit." Id. at 668, 490 N.E.2d at 1052 (citing Sears v. Rutishauser, 102 I11.
2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1984)).
65. Sears, 102 Ill. 2d at 411, 466 N.E.2d at 214. The defendant's attorney issued a
subpoena requesting the patient records of the plaintiff's expert. The trial court correctly
denied the request as violative of the privilege. Id.
66. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Weaver v. Georgia Power Co., 134 Ga. App. 696, 215 S.E.2d 503
(1975); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949). See supra notes
53-65 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. v. McMichael, 115 Ark. 101, 171 S.W. 115
(1914). The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that asking experts whether they had testified frequently for the plaintiff railroad company or for other railroad companies in the
past was not prejudicial error. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
70. Barios v. Davis, 415 S.W.2d 714, 716 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967). The court permitted
questions regarding the number of times, for whom, and where the expert medical witness testified, how much he received in fees, and his yearly income from testifying and
reviewing case files. Id. See generally Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 222 S.W.2d
266 (Tex. Ct. App. 1949) (the court permitted counsel to question a medical expert regarding other personal injury cases and their locations, but did not allow cross-examination on the merits of those cases).
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evidence relevant to the expert witness's credibility. 7 ' Those jurisdictions disallowing such examination reason that it introduces
collateral matters.72
The federal courts generally allow wide latitude in cross-examining experts regarding their prior employment as witnesses. 73 The
Second Circuit has held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by allowing the plaintiff's counsel to ask the defendant's
expert whether he testified as a defense witness in other, similar
cases. 74 Such cross-examination, however, is not without limits.
In a recent case, United States FootballLeague v. National Football
League,75 the Second Circuit upheld the district court's exclusion
of questions regarding prior testimony by an expert in other cases.
The defendant's damages expert had testified previously in two
similar antitrust actions, 76 each involving highly complex issues
and a series of appeals. The court noted that under these circumstances, the district court acted well within its discretionary power
to "avoid a confusing
and complex digression into.., totally unre77
lated cases."

71. Schuler v. St. Louis Can Co., 322 Mo. 765, 775, 18 S.W.2d. 42, 46 (1929). The
plaintiff's counsel was permitted to ask the defendant's medical expert whether he made
his living "at the behest of insurance companies." Id.
72. See, e.g., State v. Superbuilt Mfg. Co., 204 Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707 (1955) (the
court did not allow counsel to cross-examine an expert regarding the fees the expert had
charged for testifying in other cases because it would require the court to allow the expert
to justify the fees); Zamsky v. Public Parking Auth., 378 Pa. 38, 105 A.2d 335 (1954)
(questions regarding an expert's earnings from performing other services for the party
retaining him to testify were collateral and inadmissible).
73. See, e.g., Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980). The court of
appeals upheld the district court's admission of questions regarding the expert's fees in
prior cases, the basis for his calculation of those fees, and details of a consulting "corporation" that he headed for the purposes of providing expert testimony. Id. at 783. The
questions, which elicited responses including specific dollar amounts of yearly fees received by the expert, totalled more than 30 pages of the record. Id. at 784. The court
noted the conspicuous lack of cases addressing whether this type of examination was
permissible: "The parties have not cited and our research has not uncovered any federal
cases on this point. Cases from the state courts are split." Id.
74. United States v. Abrams, 427 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832
(1970). The court noted that the cross-examination had "elicited no more than that the
witness was friendly with appellant and that he had previously testified as a defense expert in two similar cases." Id. The court deemed such evidence relevant and admissible
to show bias. Id. at 90.
75. 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
76. Id. at 1375. The expert had testified as an economist at both trials, one involving
the break-up of the monopoly held by AT&T. See Buffalo Broadcasting Co. v. American
Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 744
F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211 (1985); Southern Pac. Communications Co.v.AT&T Co., 556 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985).
77. United States Football League, 842 F.2d at 1375. The court distinguished the
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TROWER v JONES

A.

The Facts

Trower and her husband brought a medical malpractice action
against their family physician, Dr. Jones.7 8 Trower alleged that
Jones's misdiagnosis of, and subsequent improper treatment for,
pelvic inflammatory disease forced Trower to undergo several operations that otherwise would not have been necessary.79 Trower
consulted an attorney, who contacted the American Board of Medical Legal Consultants ("the Board"). Trower's expert witness at
trial, Dr. Martins, had received her file through the Board. °
At trial, the court permitted the defense counsel to impeach Dr.
Martins by cross-examining him about his annual income derived
from his work as an expert witness"1 and the frequency with which
he testified for a particular class of litigants.82 After a jury verdict
in favor of the defendant, Trower appealed claiming the trial court
erred in allowing the impeachment of Martins by this inquiry. 83
The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial.8 4
The court distinguished Trower from Sears v. Rutishauser, stating
prohibited examination from that allowed in Walker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 412
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1969). In Walker, the permissible cross-examination focused on the
expert's contradictory testimony regarding his qualifications in an earlier case, but did
not explore the expert's testimony on the merits. Id. at 63-64.
78. Trower v. Jones, 149 I11.App. 3d 705, 708, 500 N.E.2d 1134, 1135 (4th Dist.
1986). Trower characterized Jones as "her family physician." In addition, Dr. Jones
testified that he had treated the plaintiff "since she was a child." Id. at 711, 500 N.E.2d
at 1138.
79. Id. at 709, 500 N.E.2d at 1136-37. Trower ultimately underwent a reversible
colostomy and had her left fallopian tube and ovary removed due to pelvic inflammatory
disease. At the time of the appeal, Trower was unable to become pregnant. Id. at 709,
500 N.E.2d at 1137. Jones initially had diagnosed her as suffering from a simple virus,
and later diagnosed her as possibly having an ectopic pregnancy. Id. at 708, 500 N.E.2d
at 1136.
80. Trower v. Jones, 121 Ill. 2d 211, 213, 520 N.E.2d 297, 298 (1988). The plaintiff's
expert, Dr. Martins, testified at trial that the Board is a for-profit association of medical
professionals established to review case files and provide expert testimony in malpractice
trials. Id.
81. Id. Over objection, Martins testified that his income from his work with the
Board in 1983 and 1984 totaled $73,000. Martins also testified, without objection, that
80% of his "professional time" involved work for the Board. Id. at 214, 520 N.E.2d at
298.
82. Id. Martins stated at trial that he had been with the Board since 1983 and had
reviewed more than 700 cases, including giving depositions in approximately 60 of those
cases and trial testimony as an expert witness in 30 actions. Id. When asked, over objection, whether he had testified for plaintiffs in all 30 cases, Martins answered: "Of the
majority, yes." Id.
83. Trower, 149 Iil. App. 3d at 720, 500 N.E.2d at 1143.
84. Id. at 724, 500 N.E.2d at 1146.
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that the examination in Sears regarding referrals from the retaining
attorney "directly linked the witness's pecuniary interests to his
testimony." 5 Therefore, the court rejected Jones's contention that
the Sears holding should be extended to permit questions regarding
the circumstances surrounding testimony given by virtue of any
type of referral.8 6 The court also held that the trial court erred in
allowing Dr. Martins to be questioned about his income. The
court reasoned that the inquiry was "in no way relevant to any
legitimate purpose of cross-examination." ' I The court concluded
that these errors were clearly prejudicial8 8 because the outcome of
the case was dependent, to a great extent, on the credibility of both
testifying doctors, Martins and Jones. 9
B.

The Holding and Reasoning

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the circuit court's judgment for the defendant Jones. 90
The court expressly overruled the early precedents of McMahon v.
Chicago City Railway,9' Chicago City Railway v. Smith, and Chicago & East Illinois Railroad v. Schmitz.9 2 The court conceded
that those cases had limited cross-examination to inquiries relating
only to the specific litigants and litigation.93 The court, however,
acknowledged that those cases merely held that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in disallowing certain types of cross-examination. 94 Those rulings, the court reasoned, did not mandate the
conclusion that inquiries such as the defense counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Martins are never permissible to demonstrate bias,
motive, or financial interest.95
Furthermore, the court stated that the nature of modern litigation has increased the difficulty of effectively impeaching experts
85.

Id. at 722, 500 N.E.2d at 1145.

86. Id.
87. Id. The court noted that the defense counsel's questions regarding Dr. Martin's
income were posed to demonstrate that Martins was not a "full-time general practitioner." Martins, however, had testified on cross-examination that he devoted 80% of his
time to his work for the Board. The questions regarding income were therefore unnecessary. Id. at 724, 500 N.E.2d at 1146.
88. Id. at 722, 500 N.E.2d at 1145.
89. Id. The court emphasized the fact that Dr. Martins was the plaintiff's only expert medical witness.
90. Trower v. Jones, 121 Il1. 2d 211, 222, 520 N.E.2d 297, 302 (1988).
91. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
92. Trower, 121 Il1. 2d at 222, 520 N.E.2d at 302.
93. Id. at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299.
94. Id.
95. Id. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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through cross-examination.96 In addition, the court reasoned that
the adoption of Federal Rules of Evidence 70317 and 70598 augments the difficulty the cross-examining counsel faces in discrediting experts.99 The court stated that these rules generally facilitate
expert testimony by allowing experts to render opinions without
revealing the underlying data supporting them.'0o
The court did not use its holding in Sears as authority in Trower.
The defense counsel argued that Sears applied because no perceivable distinction differentiated cross-examination regarding the employment relationship between a party or attorney and a witness,
permissible under Sears, from that between a witness and a referral
service.'
Rather than extending the Sears holding as the defense
counsel urged, the Trower court held that questions regarding income derived from testifying generally are relevant and admissible
of their own force.' 02 The court stated that often the true financial
benefit an expert derives from testifying is not indicated by re96. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299. The court acknowledged the
proliferation of "expert 'locator' services" which enable litigants to procure expert witness to advocate their positions, but did not expressly characterize the Board as such a
service. Id. at 216, 520 N.E.2d at 299. See also Graham, supra note 5, at 37 (the increase
in products liability and medical malpractice actions has resulted in a corresponding increase in the use of expert witnesses).
97. Rule 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion
or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 703.
98. Rule 705 states:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court
requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
FED. R. EVID. 705.
99. Rules 703 and 705 were adopted in Illinois in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186, 417
N.E.2d 1322, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981). In Wilson, the court reasoned that adopting these rules "eliminates the time-consuming process of posing long hypothetical questions that afford an opportunity to sum up or reiterate the evidence in the middle of a
case." Id. at 195, 417 N.E.2d at 1327. In addition, the court noted that the burden
placed upon opposing counsel to bring out the data relied upon by the testifying expert is
not undue. Extensive pretrial discovery enables the cross-examining party to sufficiently
cross-examine. Id. at 194, 417 N.E.2d at 1327.
100. Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 215, 520 N.E.2d at 299. The data relied upon by the
expert in formulating his opinion can be revealed by opposing counsel upon cross-examination. Id.
101. Id. at 217-18, 520 N.E.2d at 300.
102. Id. at 218, 520 N.E.2d at 300.
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vealing his fee in the case at bar.'0 3 Therefore, a general inquiry
into annual income derived from acting as an expert witness is permissible, as it more clearly reflects reality.'"
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that allowing the disputed cross-examination would result in the impermissible introduction of collateral matters.105 The plaintiff argued that
introducing evidence not directly connected with the principal controversy would prejudice the calling party, confuse the jury, and
necessitate a detailed and time-consuming rehabilitation of the witness. °6 The court balanced this possibility against the need for
07
effective cross-examination, and concluded that an explanation'
by the witness of the reasonableness of his fees and his tendency to
testify for only one type of litigant should be sufficient to avoid
prejudice and confusion. ' 8

IV.

ANALYSIS

The trier of fact in modern litigation must understand and evaluate highly technical and specialized information. As a result, the
103. Id. A witness can establish a "track record" by testifying for successful litigants
in a series of cases, thereby enhancing his employment opportunities as an expert witness
in the future.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 219, 520 N.E.2d at 301. See generally Ryan v. Blakey, 71 111. App. 3d 339,
389 N.E.2d 604 (5th Dist. 1979) (introducing names, amounts sought, and legal theories
of pending cases in which the defendant's expert was to testify was irrelevant and prejudicial to defendant); Forest Preserve Dist. v. Kelley, 69 Ill. App. 3d 309, 387 N.E.2d 368
(2d Dist. 1979) (introducing evidence of the value of land dissimilar to the land at issue in
an eminent domain proceeding was prejudicial and misleading to the jury); Department
of Pub. Works and Bldgs. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 40 Il1. App. 3d 623, 356 N.E.2d 376
(2d Dist. 1976) (the trial court properly excluded evidence that the defendant's real estate
appraisal expert had been employed by the state previously for purposes of evaluating the
property at issue).
106. Rehabilitation takes place when, through redirect examination, counsel improves or corrects the witness's standing with the trier of fact after the witness's credibility has been damaged by cross-examination. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1157 (5th

ed. 1979). In Trower, the plaintiff's counsel argued that such rehabilitation would, in
many cases, only be accomplished by introducing extensive evidence to substantiate the
reasonableness of the fees the expert charged for testifying. Trower, 121 IIl. 2d at 219,
520 N.E.2d at 301.
107. The court left the matter of deciding whether a witness has been afforded the
sufficient opportunity to explain the reasonableness of his actions to the circuit courts'
discretion. Trower, 121 Il1. 2d at 219, 520 N.E.2d at 310.
108. Id. The plaintiff argued that adequately preparing the allowable impeachment
and rehabilitation evidence would render "the pretrial discovery process unnecessarily
burdensome." Id. at 221, 520 N.E.2d at 302. In response, the court cautioned that its
holding in no way affects the evidentiary privileges or the traditional discretion allowed
the circuit courts with regard to discovery rulings. Id. at 221-22, 520 N.E.2d at 302.
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need for expert testimony has increased considerably.1 9 Thus, the
policy considerations that motivated the court in Trower to expand
the permitted range of cross-examination of experts are the proper
subject of concern. The Trower court stated that an unfortunate
side effect of modern litigation is an increased potential for unscrupulous and partisan experts to improperly influence a jury, rather
than fully inform them, by virtue of the experts' superior knowledge."' The Trower court correctly recognized that the best
method available to demonstrate an expert's bias or interest is to
probe the expert's motives for becoming involved in the litigation.
This expanded range of cross-examination allowed by Trower
has the potential to provide litigants with several benefits. One potential benefit is that inquiry into the expert's motives will provide
the trier of fact with a more complete picture of the source of specialized knowledge upon whom the trier of fact must rely to resolve issues."'I Another potential benefit after Trower is a higher
quality of expert testimony. If expert witnesses are faced with the
prospect of a disclosure which would severely discredit them and,
therefore, damage or destroy the calling party's case, the experts'
employability undoubtedly will be affected. In this respect, the experts' self-interest acts to restrain any tendencies to testify in a biased manner based on purely pecuniary motives. Therefore, in the
long term, experts may change their behavior for the better." 2
Despite the potential benefits inherent in Trower, in a practical
109. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Other areas experiencing an increase
of use of expert testimony include securities litigation, toxic torts, and patent infringement lawsuits.
110. Trower, 121 I1. 2d at 217-18, 520 N.E.2d at 300-01. This misuse of expert testimony is aptly illustrated in Sanchez v. Black Bros. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 264, 423 N.E.2d
1309 (1st Dist. 1981). The appellate court reversed and remanded this products liability
case for a new trial, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the
plaintiff's request to use a speech given by the defendant's expert to impeach the expert.
Several years prior to trial, the expert had spoken to a group of fellow engineers regarding
effective methods of testifying. The expert's advice included using "science as a foreign
language" to "terminate cross-examination . . . in a hurry." Id. at 279, 423 N.E.2d at
1320. The expert explained that he "allowed" the jury to understand his testimony under
direct examination, but not under cross-examination. Id. Counsel attempting to attack
the credibility of an expert normally will not have such blatant evidence of bias with
which to impeach the witness.
Ill . In Kemeny v. Skorch, 22 111. App. 2d 160, 159 N.E.2d 489 (1st Dist. 1959), the
court described the expert witness as "part of the trial apparatus ....
As such, every
possible step should be taken to channel his contribution in a direction that will serve the
ends of justice." Id. at 171, 159 N.E.2d at 494.
112. In advocating inquiries such as those sanctioned by Trower, one commentator
sarcastically suggests that the result may be to prompt experts "to perform actual work in
their alleged areas of expertise." Graham, supra note 96, at 52.
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sense, the decision represents an inadequate means of achieving
these goals. Although the trial court is vested with the discretionary power to prohibit cross-examination it deems impermissible,
the direction trial courts should take in exercising this discretion
remains unclear. Because Trower suggests that a cross-examiner
may pose virtually any question affecting the credibility of the expert as a witness, trial courts attempting to follow Trower may allow, as the plaintiff in Trower posited, a series of subtrials on
remote issues.' '3 Moreover, because Trower permits heightened
scrutiny of expert witnesses and allows parties calling experts the
corresponding opportunity to justify the expert's actions during rehabilitation, litigants will expend additional time and resources in
discovery' 14 and trials involving expert testimony.
Allowing expert witnesses to explain the reasonableness of fees,
the proportion of professional time spent in litigation-related activities, and the tendency to testify for certain classes of litigants may
not provide as sufficient a rehabilitation as the Trower decision suggests. Determining "reasonableness" is an exercise in relative argument that could necessitate a tremendous amount of additional
evidence."I5 In technically complex litigation, rehabilitation could
include introducing additional experts to testify to the reasonableness of the original expert's actions. 116 Allowing such rehabilitation could confuse the jury. Yet, to disallow a sufficient attempt at
rehabilitation is prejudicial. The Trower opinion offers little guidance for the circuit courts on this dilemma."I7
Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court departed from a long established precedent" 8 in Trower, but did not set forth the parameters
of its departure with sufficient clarity. Although the court expressly overruled three earlier decisions," 9 it ignored its recent
113.

Trower, 121 Ill. 2d at 217, 520 N.E.2d at 300.

114.

Illinois already allows extensive discovery of testifying witnesses. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 1 10A, para. 220 (1987). See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

115. For example, statistics and other empirical evidence may be required to determine what constitutes a "reasonable" fee for testimony by an expert with similar qualifications and experience as the witness at trial.
116.

The plaintiff's counsel in Trower warned of this possibility. Trower, 121 I11.
2d at

219, 520 N.E.2d at 301. The court responded that the party calling the expert will be
permitted to respond only if a denial of such an opportunity would be "unfairly prejudicial." Id.
117.
118.

Id.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

119.

Id. The court overruled McMahon v. Chicago City Railway, 239 II1. 334, 88

N.E. 223 (1909), Chicago City Railway v. Smith, 226 II1. 178, 80 N.E. 716 (1907), and
Chicago & East Illinois Railroad v. Schmitz, 211 I11.
446, 71 N.E. 1050 (1904). See

generally text accompanying notes 27-34.

1088

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 20

holding in Sears v. Rutishauser.120 The early decisions 12 imposed a
limitation on cross-examination to allow only questions regarding
employment relationships and fee arrangements between the expert
and the party retaining him, but unfortunately did so with little
explanation. 1 22 The court in Sears, however, surveyed relevant
case law and concluded that in Illinois, cross-examination should
be "strictly limited" to questions regarding the number and frequency of, and remuneration for, referrals from the litigating
attorney. 123
The Sears decision was the most equivocal on the subject to date.
The court's holding set forth the outer limits of permissible crossexamination; yet, the court in Trower declined to admit that it was
extending the Sears decision in surpassing those limitations. 24 The
Trower court also declined to expressly overrule Sears, instead basing its holding on policy considerations.' 25 Unfortunately, implementation of these policies was not framed in specific and practical
terms suitable for consistent application in the courtroom context.
V.

CONCLUSION

In Trower v. Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court attempted to devise a remedy for the problems associated with expert testimony.
The court's efforts resulted in facilitating the revelation of factors
affecting an expert witness's credibility to the trier of fact as a part
of the entire impression expert testimony makes in the courtroom.
In this limited respect, the court's opinion in Trower reflects an
appropriate response to sensible adjudicative policy considerations.
The court's opinion in Trower, however, gives insufficient direction
to the circuit courts. The opinion intimates that prohibiting inquiries even remotely related to the case at bar could constitute an
abuse of discretion warranting reversal. Because the Illinois
Supreme Court failed to delineate the permissible boundaries of
120.

102 Ill.
2d 402, 466 N.E.2d 210 (1984). For a summary of the Sears decision,

see text accompanying notes 53-65.
121.
122.

See supra notes 22-34 and accompanying text.
See Graham, supra note 5, at 47. In discussing Illinois law, Graham notes that

"many of the reported decisions in this area simply state the court's conclusion as to

whether or not the questioning is proper without any indication of the court's reasoning."
Id. See also Schmitz, 211 Ill. at 456, 71 N.E. at 1054 (the court merely stated that

-[c]ross examination upon the independent cases of the same character, and about the
same time as the principal case, is not allowed").
123.
124.

Sears, 102 Ill.
2d at 411, 466 N.E.2d at 214.
See Trower, 121 Ill.
2d at 218, 520 N.E.2d at 300 ("we do not base our decision

on the strict analogy to the facts in Sears suggested by defendant").
125.

Id.

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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cross-examination and rehabilitation, Trower may frustrate the
court's goal. Ultimately, the Trower decision in some instances
may provide the jury with a more accurate picture of the expert
witnesses upon whom they rely for information. Nevertheless,
Trower is certain to escalate the "battle of experts" in future decisions in this area.
JULIE

A. CORRELL

